











Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/148833                     
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
The Usefulness of Financial Accounting Information: 
Evidence from the Field* 
Stefano Cascino 
London School of Economics 
s.cascino@lse.ac.uk
Mark A. Clatworthy 
University of Bristol 
mark.clatworthy@bristol.ac.uk 
Beatriz García Osma 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
bgosma@emp.uc3m.es 
Joachim Gassen 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
gassen@wiwi.hu-berlin.de  
Shahed Imam 
University of Warwick 
shahed.imam@wbs.ac.uk 
Running Head: The Usefulness of Financial Accounting Information 
∗ We thank Markus Arnold, Mary Barth (senior editor and discussant), Ulf Brüggemann, Christina Dargenidou 
(discussant), Matt Hall, Kevin Jackson, Peter Joos, Guy Jubb, Laurence van Lent (editor), Victor Maas, Stephen Taylor 
(discussant), Geoffrey Whittington, Stephen Zeff and participants at the 2016 BAFA Annual Conference, 2015 EAA 
ICAS Symposium, 2016 EAA Annual Congress, IASB-ICAS Meeting on the Future of Financial Reporting, 2015 
EUFin Conference, XII Workshop on Empirical Research in Financial Accounting, University of Amsterdam, 
University of Bath, University of Bologna, BI Norwegian Business School, Cardiff University, Columbia Business 
School, ESSEC Business School, University of Essex, Ghent University, University of Glasgow, Heriot-Watt 
University, Humboldt University Berlin, ICJCE/AT1 Madrid Meeting, IFASS Toronto, Keele School of Management, 
King’s College London, Lancaster University, LUISS Business School, Magdeburg University, University of 
Manchester, Mannheim University, Open University, Portsmouth University, Universidade de São Paulo, University 
of St. Gallen, Stockholm School of Economics, Strathclyde University, Tilburg University, National Taiwan 
University and University of Technology Sydney for helpful comments and discussions. We acknowledge the 
financial support of the Scottish Accountancy Trust for Education and Research, Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Scotland (ICAS) and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG). Beatriz García Osma 
acknowledges financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Science (ECO2016-77579 and PID2019-111143GB-
C33). Joachim Gassen acknowledges financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft-Project-ID 
403041268 - TRR 266. A summary of the first phase of this study intended for an audience of practitioners has been 
circulated by ICAS and EFRAG under the title ‘Professional investors and the decision usefulness of financial 
reporting.’ We are grateful to Michelle Crickett, Françoise Flores, Saskia Slomp, Rasmus Sommer and Allister 
Wilson, who provided invaluable assistance for this project. Ethical approval for this project was granted at the 
University of Bristol. Finally, we acknowledge the contribution of Thomas Jeanjean to the earlier phases of our study. 
Any remaining errors are our own. 
Correspondence to: Mark Clatworthy, School of Accounting and Finance, University of Bristol, Priory Road 
Complex, Bristol, BS8 1TU, U.K. E-mail: mark.clatworthy@bristol.ac.uk. Tel. +44 117 39 41479. 
Forthcoming at The Accounting Review 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008083
 
 
The Usefulness of Financial Accounting Information: 
Evidence from the Field 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine how investment professionals assess the usefulness of financial accounting 
information depending on their information acquisition objectives and preparers’ earnings 
management incentives. We conduct a survey experiment based on face-to-face interviews with 
investment professionals and document two main results. First, we find that, compared with 
investment professionals assigned a firm valuation objective, those assigned a managerial 
performance evaluation objective assess accounting information as significantly less useful. 
Second, we find no systematic evidence that preparers’ earnings management incentives 
negatively affect investment professionals’ assessments of accounting information usefulness. To 
elucidate this second finding, we conduct a large-scale follow-up online experiment. Our results 
continue to offer no support for the effect of earnings management incentives on investment 
professionals’ assessments of accounting information usefulness, irrespective of preparers’ 
corporate governance quality. Instead, we find that poor corporate governance, by itself, reduces 
the usefulness of accounting information to investment professionals. 
 
Keywords: decision usefulness; financial reporting objectives; earnings management; corporate 
governance; investment professionals; relevance; representational faithfulness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Do investment professionals assess the decision usefulness of financial accounting 
information depending on what they aim to use the information for? Also, are their assessments 
influenced by preparers’ earnings management incentives? 
These questions are at the core of fundamental and enduring debates among accounting 
regulators and academics. Financial reporting is meant to fulfil two main information acquisition 
objectives—a valuation objective and a managerial performance evaluation or stewardship 
objective (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010). Over time, however, the conceptual frameworks 
of major accounting standard setters have subsumed valuation and stewardship within a single 
‘decision usefulness’ objective, even though general purpose financial statements may not be 
capable of satisfying multiple objectives simultaneously (Murphy, O’Connell, and Ó hÓgartaigh 
2013; Zeff 2013; Pelger 2016). These developments have also largely overlooked the well-
established view in the academic literature that using financial reporting information for 
contracting creates earnings management incentives (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Yet, relatively 
little is known about the extent to which earnings management is actually pervasive (Ball 2013) 
and undermines the decision usefulness of financial accounting information. 
The theoretical literature offers important insights on our two questions. With regard to the 
first, Gjesdal (1981) demonstrates that an accounting system designed for valuation purposes 
generally differs from one designed for managerial performance evaluation. For managerial 
performance evaluation, information should enable investors to assess managers’ unobservable 
effort (Harris and Raviv 1978; Holmström 1979). In contrast, for firm valuation, information 
should help predict the timing, amount, and risk of future cash flows, regardless of whether they 
are attributable to managerial effort (Paul 1992; Guttman 2013). Regarding the second question, 
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prior theoretical research shows that preparers’ earnings management typically decreases the 
informativeness of accounting information, though the ultimate effect is harder to predict when 
markets form rational expectations (Stein 1989), and when models account for various features of 
firms’ corporate governance systems (Goldman and Slezak 2006; Laux and Laux 2009). 
Only few empirical studies explore the effects of users’ information acquisition objectives on 
accounting information usefulness. This limited empirical research fails to document a conflict 
between the different roles of accounting information (e.g., Bushman, Engel, and Smith 2006; 
Banker, Huang, and Natarajan 2009). These studies are predominantly based on observational 
data, mainly rely on indirect proxies of information usefulness, and typically employ cross-
sectional identification strategies. In contrast, a vast empirical literature documents associations 
between earnings management incentives and financial accounting properties (e.g., Healy and 
Wahlen 1999; Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010). In particular, starting with Healy (1985) and the 
bonus plan hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), there is overwhelming support for the 
idea that bonuses linked to accounting information increase the likelihood of earnings 
management, with very few voices challenging this conventional view (Ball 2013). 
In this paper, we provide novel evidence on how investment professionals assess the decision 
usefulness of financial accounting information. We conduct a survey experiment based on 81 face-
to-face interviews with experienced investment professionals from 16 countries to directly elicit 
their views on information usefulness through both quantitative assessments and verbal responses. 
We present investment professionals with the abridged financial statements of a fictional firm and 
manipulate: (i) their information acquisition objectives (i.e., firm valuation or managerial 
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performance evaluation); and (ii) preparers’ earnings management incentives (i.e., whether or not 
managerial compensation in the case firm is tied to accounting information).1  
While the small sample of our survey experiment enables us to gauge the specific rationales 
underlying investment professionals’ information usefulness assessments with precision, it also 
limits statistical power. Further, while our survey experiment allows us to focus on investment 
professionals’ assessments of usefulness, it does not allow us to observe how our treatments affect 
their actions. To alleviate both concerns, we examine investment professionals’ behavior directly 
via a large-scale follow-up online experiment.  
In our second experiment, we task a subject group of 833 investment professionals with the 
selection of income statement line items to construct an adjusted earnings measure. The task-based 
nature of this experiment enables us to evaluate how the assessments documented in our first 
experiment relate to actions in the second. While the quality of the case firm corporate governance 
system is held constant in the survey experiment, we take advantage of the larger sample size of 
the follow-up online experiment and manipulate, along with earnings management incentives, the 
quality of the case firm corporate governance system as well. This enables us to examine whether 
stronger corporate governance arrangements mitigate investment professionals’ potential 
information usefulness concerns when managerial compensation is tied to earnings (Laux and 
Laux, 2009). We expect our two-pronged approach to improve the external validity of our findings 
(Bloomfield, Nelson, and Soltes. 2016). 
Taken together, our experiments yield several key results. First, compared with investment 
professionals assigned a firm valuation objective, those assigned a managerial performance 
                                                     
1 Throughout the paper, we refer to ‘earnings management incentives’ as shorthand for whether the managers’ 
compensation in the case firm is tied to accounting or non-accounting data. Our aim is to evaluate investment 
professionals’ assessments of accounting information usefulness when this key determinant of earnings management 
behavior varies. 
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evaluation objective assess accounting information as significantly less relevant. In line with 
theoretical predictions, when evaluating managerial performance, investment professionals prefer 
accounting numbers that are informative of managerial actions to those potentially affected by 
factors outside managerial control. In contrast, for firm valuation, investment professionals prefer 
information that is relevant for forecasting future cash flows. These results indicate that 
information acquisition objectives affect the extent to which investment professionals assess 
accounting information as useful. This confirms theoretical predictions and helps to balance prior 
empirical evidence based on observational data.  
Second, when we experimentally increase earnings management incentives by linking 
managerial compensation to accounting data, we find no evidence that it affects either information 
usefulness assessments or the actions of investment professionals. Our follow-up online 
experiment reveals that this result is not due to a lack of statistical power and does not depend on 
the corporate governance quality of the case firm. Subject to the potential limitations of our 
experimental design, this finding is at odds with much of the theoretical and empirical literature 
suggesting that earnings management incentives are a pervasive problem in capital markets (e.g., 
Stein 1989; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). However, it is in line with recent skepticism 
over the pervasiveness and significance of earnings management (e.g., Ball 2013). 
Third, while we find no evidence that the effect of earnings management incentives depends 
on corporate governance quality, we also show that, when corporate governance quality is poor, 
investment professionals are significantly less likely to use accounting numbers over which 
managers have more discretion. 
Our study makes several contributions. Drake, Hales, and Rees (2019) provide initial cross-
sectional evidence on the task-dependent nature of information usefulness assessments. By using 
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an experiment to identify causal determinants of investment professionals’ information usefulness 
assessments, we show that the usefulness of financial accounting information is contingent on 
users’ information acquisition objectives (Anderson, Brown, Hodder, Patrick, and Hopkins 2015; 
Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp 2015). Thus, our findings contribute to the debate on whether a 
single set of general-purpose financial statements can simultaneously satisfy potentially competing 
user needs (Drymiotes and Hemmer 2013; Murphy et al. 2013; Zeff 2013; Pelger 2016).  
Our examination of the extent to which preparers’ earnings management incentives affect 
either investment professionals’ information usefulness assessments or decisions advances the 
long line of research that weighs the incentive alignment benefits of managerial discretion over 
accounting numbers (Sloan 1993; Ball 2001; Lambert 2001; Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner 2010) 
against the associated costs (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; 1986; Healy 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, 
and Sloan 1995; Goldman and Slezak 2006; Crocker and Slemrod 2007; Dichev, Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal 2013).  
Finally, by showing that—despite their inherent limitations—financial statements remain a 
primary information source for investment professionals, our novel descriptive evidence 
contributes to the literature on the importance of financial statements vis-à-vis other sources of 
information (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Beyer et al. 2010; Basu, Duong, Markov, and Tan 2013). 
II. CONCEPTUAL UNERPINNINGS AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Decision Usefulness and Information Acquisition Objectives 
The theoretical literature predicts that users of financial statements demand accounting information 
for both contracting and valuation purposes (Lambert 2001). When evaluating managers, users 
require information that enables them to separate managerial effort from value-relevant exogenous 
factors, such as industry and market-wide dynamics (Holmström 1979; Gjesdal 1981; Paul 1992; 
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Sloan 1993; Lambert 2001; Christensen, Feltham, and Sabac 2005). In contrast, the valuation role 
of accounting information is to resolve uncertainty about firms’ future cash flows, regardless of 
whether they are attributable to managerial effort (Paul 1992; Guttman 2013). Although theoretical 
research indicates that an accounting system designed for firm valuation generally differs from 
one designed for managerial performance evaluation (Gjesdal 1981), it also identifies conditions 
under which the two roles of accounting information coincide (Drymiotes and Hemmer 2013). 
Empirical evidence on the interactions and trade-offs between different uses of accounting 
information is scarce (O’Connell 2007; Murphy et al. 2013). Bushman et al. (2006) and Banker et 
al. (2009) examine the association between the value relevance and the compensation relevance of 
earnings and reject the null hypothesis that the valuation and contracting roles of accounting are 
unrelated. However, the indirect proxies for information usefulness they use may not precisely 
measure the underlying constructs of interest. In a recent web-based survey of information 
overload in financial reporting, Drake et al. (2019) report that investment professionals’ ratings of 
the importance of financial statements differ depending on the task at hand. 2 They find that 
investment professionals rate the income statement and the statement of cash flows as more useful 
in assessing future cash flows than for most other tasks, whereas the balance sheet is rated as 
important for assessing credit risk. Taken together, prior empirical work relies mostly on cross-
sectional identification, says little about why observed associations exist, and cannot reliably 
establish causal relations. 
Prior research also yields conflicting evidence on whether financial accounting information 
aids managerial performance evaluation. Georgiou (2018) shows that fair value information, which 
                                                     
2 Although the key focus of their study is on information overload, Drake et al. (2019) also analyze six tasks: ‘assessing 
future cash flows,’ ‘estimating firm value,’ ‘identifying red flags,’ ‘evaluating risks and uncertainties,’ ‘assessing 
credit risk,’ and ‘evaluating management.’ 
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is generally regarded as of high relevance, may interfere with analysts’ and fund managers’ 
managerial performance assessments. In contrast, Anderson et al. (2015) report that fair value 
information can sometimes benefit managerial performance evaluation by allowing users to 
disentangle managerial effort from exogenous market factors.3  
How useful accounting information is to users with different objectives therefore remains an 
open, yet fundamental, question. Accounting standard setters decompose the usefulness of 
accounting information into two fundamental qualitative characteristics: relevance and 
representational faithfulness (e.g., FASB 2010; IASB 2018). Relevance is defined as the ability 
of information to influence decision-making, assuming it is faithfully represented. Information is 
considered to be faithfully represented if it is complete, neutral, and free from errors. We posit that 
investment professionals regard accounting information as less relevant for assessing managerial 
performance than for firm valuation. As standard setters calibrate their reporting regimes to focus 
on information that helps assess the magnitude, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows (Zeff 
2013), our expectation is motivated by theoretical studies that argue that, while an accounting 
system designed to assess future cash flows produces a useful signal for firm valuation, the same 
signal may not be as informative about managerial effort. This is because the signal produced by 
such a system is less informative of whether observed performance is the result of managerial 
actions or factors outside managers’ control. Accordingly, our first hypothesis is: 
H1:  Investment professionals assess the relevance of financial accounting information to 
be lower when their objective is to evaluate managerial performance. 
While H1 follows directly from the theoretical literature, it might not fully describe how users 
assess accounting information according to different objectives. First, prior empirical work based 
                                                     
3 Anderson et al. (2015) do not study differences between valuation and managerial performance assessments and 
their experimental fair value data are free from measurement uncertainty and bias (Emett and Nelson 2015). 
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on observational data has generally found that earnings data has a robust positive covariance with 
both market values and performance proxies, consistent with accounting information being a 
useful indicator for both information acquisition objectives (Bushman et al. 2006; Banker et al. 
2009). Second, under certain conditions, accounting information may produce relevant signals 
about managerial performance and firm value (Anderson et al. 2015). Lambert (2001) also 
highlights circumstances where incorporating factors outside managers’ control (e.g., relative 
performance data) can be useful for assessing managerial performance. In such circumstances, we 
would fail to find support for H1.  
Decision Usefulness and Earnings Management Incentives 
Financial accounting information is often used to align the interests of principals and agents in 
executive compensation contracts (Sloan 1993; Lambert 2001; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 
2010). In these contracts, managerial compensation is determined on the basis of accounting 
information. A long and influential stream of research documents that managers face incentives to 
manage accounting information to increase their pay (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; 1986; Healy 
1985; Holthausen et al. 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Crocker and Slemrod 2007). 
Goldman and Slezak (2006) demonstrate that incentive contracts act as a ‘double-edged sword’ by 
simultaneously increasing managerial effort and encouraging managers to misrepresent 
performance. While managers may attempt to deceive investors by managing earnings, according 
to Stein (1989), investors are not misled in equilibrium.4  
                                                     
4 Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) discuss circumstances where managerial reporting bias cannot be undone due to 
capital markets’ uncertainties about managers’ reporting objectives. In their analysis, managerial bias reduces the 
informativeness of financial reports. This interpretation is also discussed by Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005, 1115), who 
recognize that research casts doubt on the descriptive validity of the assumption that investors fully understand the 
quality of financial reporting signals and are able to infer the equilibrium level of earnings management. 
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We predict that investment professionals’ assessments of representational faithfulness depend 
on whether managers face incentives to manage earnings. Accordingly, we expect that tying 
managerial compensation to accounting information increases managers’ incentives to manage 
earnings to increase their pay, which, in turn, negatively affects investment professionals’ 
assessments of whether accounting information faithfully represents underlying firm performance. 
Our second hypothesis is therefore: 
H2: Investment professionals assess the representational faithfulness of financial 
accounting information to be lower when earnings management incentives are higher.  
H2 is a relative test and we acknowledge that earnings management may be affected by a 
variety of additional factors, including capital market incentives, the quality of accounting 
standards, audit quality, and firm-level governance (Dechow et al. 2010; Dichev et al. 2013). 
Extensive prior research shows that features of the corporate governance system, such as board 
independence, may significantly constrain earnings management (e.g., Klein 2002; Peasnell, Pope, 
and Young 2005). In a study of the interactions between the various dimensions of board quality, 
Laux and Laux (2009) demonstrate that, when the earnings-compensation relationship is strong, 
other features of the corporate governance system adapt to ensure that financial reporting quality 
is upheld. Moreover, Brown et al. (2015; 2016) report that buy-side and sell-side analysts regard 
corporate governance factors as highly influential over managers’ intentional misreporting.5 Taken 
together, these arguments make the expected relation between the use of accounting information 
in compensation contracts and earnings management unclear ex ante.  
                                                     
5 We specifically examine the interplay between earnings management incentives and corporate governance quality 
in our follow-up online experiment. 
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III.  SURVEY EXPERIMENT 
Research Design 
To test our hypotheses, we conduct a between-subject 2×2 case-based survey experiment. We 
collect data via face-to-face interviews with experienced investment professionals from 16 
countries. We employ a field-based approach, rather than a laboratory experiment with student 
subjects, because the nature of our research question requires experienced users of financial 
accounting information. Our theory assumes that users are able to separate managerial 
performance from exogenous factors—a task that may be challenging for inexperienced users 
(Emett and Nelson 2015).6 We therefore survey experienced investment professionals, who are 
familiar with both valuation and managerial performance assessments in their professional roles 
and who represent target users of financial accounting information.  
Survey experiments are a common method used to identify the causal determinants of stated 
preferences, assessments, and beliefs in many fields, including sociology (e.g., Wallander 2009), 
political science (e.g., Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, and Lupia 2006), and public economics (e.g., 
Kuziemko, Norton, Saez, and Stantcheva 2015). Compared with traditional surveys, survey 
experiments mitigate several potential biases, such as treatment-specific selection bias, 
randomization bias, interviewer bias, and behavioral effects of individuals being aware of their 
experimental subject status (e.g., List 2011; Clor-Proell, Koonce, and White 2016). 
We ask investment professionals to provide assessments of decision usefulness, rather than to 
perform a specific fictional task (e.g., make an investment, evaluate managers, etc.).7 This is 
                                                     
6 Christensen-Szalanski, and Beach (1984), List, Haigh, and Nerlove (2005), and Alevy, Haigh, and List (2007) report 
that experienced users behave more in line with rational theories of decision making than student subjects.  
7 We focus on objectives rather than tasks building on Gjesdal’s (1981) seminal analysis of the distinction between 
the valuation and stewardship roles of accounting information, that defines objectives (p. 208) as “the reasons 
[financial reporting information] is demanded.” In addition, task performance is inherently hard to observe in an 
interview setting, where surveying stated hypothetical actions triggered by assigned tasks raises more validity 
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because the nature of the task would closely relate to the information acquisition objective (i.e., 
one of our key variables of interest).8 In addition, since we gather response data through face-to-
face interviews with investment professionals, fictional tasks would appear artificial and provide 
unrealistic incentives. We use a case-based approach to test for the causal determinants of 
investment professionals’ information usefulness assessments. We manipulate: (i) the information 
acquisition objective of investment professionals, and (ii) the case firm managers’ earnings 
management incentives.9 
Our survey instrument uses seven-point Likert scales, together with open-ended questions that 
encourage investment professionals to think aloud while answering. This allows us to ask follow-
up questions to validate the numerical data from Likert scores and to explore investment 
professionals’ rationales for their assessments of usefulness.10 
The hypothetical situation in our survey revolves around a fictional case of a large European 
private manufacturing firm.11 In the case, investment professionals first read about the firm. We 
provide a summary balance sheet and annual income statement (see Exhibit 1). We also provide a 
brief summary of relevant IFRS accounting policies, as well as key areas of management judgment 
                                                     
questions than surveying assessments triggered by assigned objectives. This is especially the case for our sample of 
expert subjects that regularly face heterogenous high-stake tasks.  
8 In their survey, Drake et al. (2019) assess the relative importance of the balance sheet, income statement, statement 
of cash flows, statement of stockholders’ equity, and statement of other comprehensive income across six tasks: 
‘assessing future cash flows,’ ‘estimating firm value,’ ‘identifying red flags,’ ‘evaluating risks and uncertainties,’ 
‘assessing credit risk,’ and ‘evaluating management.’ This list of tasks exemplifies the difficulty in clearly separating 
tasks from objectives, and the existence of overlaps between tasks where, for example, identifying red flags would 
feed back into both evaluating management and estimating firm value.  
9 We design the questions to be case-dependent because we specifically aim to elicit subjects’ answers that reflect 
usefulness assessments conditional on the assigned information acquisition objective and the earnings management 
incentives inherent in the case. We do this to avoid capturing subjects’ general prior beliefs, which are likely to hinge 
on their backgrounds (e.g., education, professional experience, etc.). 
10 We include a research ethics and information consent form stating that our research has ethics committee approval. 
Further details of the development of the survey experiment are available in the Online Appendix. The full survey 
materials and details of how we code the narratives contained in the interviews and follow-up questions are available 
in the paper’s GitHub repository: https://github.com/joachim-gassen/use_fai. 
11 We choose a private firm to facilitate firm valuation without using publicly observable market prices. This may bias 
our findings towards an overall higher reliance on accounting numbers for decision-making. 
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in measuring and recognizing financial statement items. The investment professionals—the 
subjects of our survey experiment—have highly international backgrounds and are likely to be 
familiar with IFRS, but not necessarily with different national GAAP regimes. We inform our 
subjects that a leading audit firm audits the case firm and that corporate governance is externally 
evaluated to be of high quality (see Exhibit 2). The owners of the case firm are described as a small 
group of closely cooperating institutional investors that monitor the management of the firm. 
Explicitly holding these governance characteristics constant helps ensure that any observed effects 
can be attributed to our manipulation, rather than to implicit assumptions about the corporate 
governance of the case firm. In our follow-up online experiment, we explicitly manipulate 
corporate governance quality to examine its effects on information usefulness. 
To test H1, we manipulate the information acquisition objective. Investment professionals are 
assigned an objective either to ‘assess the value of the firm’ (the firm valuation treatment), or to 
‘assess the performance of the management for the current year’ (the managerial performance 
evaluation treatment). To test H2, we manipulate the presence/absence of earnings management 
incentives in the case firm, based on whether accounting (or non-accounting) information forms 
the basis of managerial bonuses. Investment professionals assigned to the accounting-based 
compensation treatment are provided with the following information on the managerial 
incentivization system of the firm:  
(The current owners) rely on individually negotiated target plans based on financial accounting 
data for managerial incentivisation. This year, management will receive a generous bonus as they 
have exceeded their target net income levels. 
Investment professionals assigned to the non-accounting-based compensation treatment are 
told that the firm relies on non-accounting (i.e., internal) data for managerial incentivization: 
(The current owners) rely on individually negotiated target plans based on internal production 
data for managerial incentivisation. This year, management will receive a generous bonus as they 
have exceeded their target production efficiency levels. 
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Taken together, the two manipulations—information acquisition objective and earnings 
management incentives—result in four distinct treatment conditions, as per Figure 1.  
We ask investment professionals to assess the relevance and representational faithfulness of 
the accounting information provided. Relevance is described as the ability of the information to 
influence decision making, assuming that it is faithfully represented. Information is described as 
faithfully represented if it is complete, neutral, and free from errors.12 Despite the separation of 
the two constructs, it is possible that the subjects conceptually link relevance and representational 
faithfulness to the extent that, if they perceive an item not to be faithfully represented, they also 
consider it to be less relevant (Kadous, Koonce, and Thayer 2012).13 However, the verbal response 
data we obtain (below) suggest that our subjects are acquainted with the two characteristics. 
The survey is designed to be completed in around 45 minutes and requires investment 
professionals to assess the usefulness of eight different balance sheet and income statement line 
items: Revenue, EBITDA, Net income, Property, plant and equipment (hereafter PPE), Financial 
instruments, Intangible assets (other than goodwill), Goodwill, and Pension liabilities. 14, 15 We 
ask our subjects to assess the extent to which these line items are relevant and faithfully represented 
                                                     
12 Our definition of representational faithfulness aims to avoid potential confusion over what the information ‘purports 
to represent.’ This latter depiction is more consistent with the high-level definition provided in the IASB Conceptual 
Framework, but less comprehensible (Erb and Pelger 2015). 
13 Kadous et al. (2012) study MBA students with less experience than the investment professionals in our survey.  
14 We design our survey to be completed in 45 minutes to increase the likelihood of investment professionals accepting 
our interview invitation. 
15 We choose line items that: (i) are prominent to investment professionals (Gu and Chen 2004; Gassen and Schwedler 
2010; Brown et al. 2015; Black, Christensen, Ciesielski, and Whipple 2018); (ii) exhibit variation in managerial 
discretion, informativeness about managerial actions and firm value, and financial accounting complexity (Drake, 
Roulstone, and Thornock 2016; Hoitash and Hoitash 2018); and (iii) reflect a tradeoff between feasibility (given time 
constraints) and generalizability (i.e., the extent to which the informativeness of our line items reflects overall financial 
statement information). We use both GAAP and non-GAAP line items because prior research suggests that investment 
professionals make adjustments to GAAP numbers (Kraft 2014), exclude from GAAP earnings items such as 
extraordinary items, discontinued items, restructuring charges (Brown et al. 2015), and rely on non-GAAP earnings 
numbers (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman 2003; Black et al. 2018; Bradshaw, 
Christensen, Gee, and Whipple 2018). 
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(using a scale from 1=strongly agree, to 7=strongly disagree).16 We also encourage our subjects to 
explain the factors that are important to them when considering the relevance and representational 
faithfulness of financial accounting information.  
Once investment professionals assess relevance and representational faithfulness, we request 
that they identify three sources of information besides financial accounting information that are 
useful for their assigned objective. To assess the relative importance of these alternative sources, 
we inform our subjects that they have a €100,000 budget to obtain relevant information. They are 
then asked to allocate the budget between the three sources they identify, together with a fourth 
source—that is, improving the usefulness of available accounting information. This provides an 
estimate of the relative value placed on the different sources of information, given the objective of 
information acquisition. The survey ends with several open-ended questions.  
Sample Description 
To recruit our subjects, we cooperate with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland 
(ICAS) and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG). ICAS and EFRAG 
initially identify 101 suitable candidates for our study.17 From this list, we conduct first-stage pilot 
interviews with six individuals to finalize our case design and survey instrument. We schedule 
interviews with 82 investment professionals; of these, one decided not to sign the ethics consent 
form. The remaining 81 subjects form the basis of our Full Sample. From within this sample, we 
                                                     
16 For the subsequent presentation of the data and results, we recode the scales for ease of interpretation so that higher 
values indicate higher usefulness. While we use the term ‘financial investments’ in the case material to communicate 
the nature of the financial instruments (non-derivative equity) more efficiently, we use the more neutral term ‘financial 
instruments’ in the interpretation of the results.  
17 This includes investment professionals recommended to us by ICAS and EFRAG who were eventually unable to 
participate in the study. Although the involvement of ICAS and EFRAG skews our sample towards investment 
professionals with more accounting experience, we would have been unable to secure the participation of such a large 
and experienced sample without their cooperation. It is also common for surveys of experienced capital market 
participants to cooperate with other organizations to enlist research subjects (e.g., Graham et al. 2005; Elliott, Hodge, 
and Jackson 2008; Clor-Proell et al. 2015; Dichev et al. 2013; 2016; Reimsbach, Hahn, and Gürtürk 2018).  
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rely on five subjects to conduct a second-stage pilot to finalize our survey experiment design. As 
these five subjects receive the same case material and survey as the other subjects, we include them 
in the Full Sample on which we base our descriptive analyses. These subjects are, however, 
excluded from the experimental analyses. We also exclude from our main analysis 14 interviews 
with investment professionals who fail the manipulation checks, to ensure that all subjects are 
properly treated.18 Our Experimental Sample therefore comprises 62 investment professionals, 
generating a total of 537 verbal responses. Table 1, Panel A, summarizes the sample composition. 
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for the Full Sample. Unreported analyses of the 
different samples and treatment conditions reveal no significant demographic differences across 
treatment groups.19 Table 1 reports the distribution by geographic location and age group. The 
sample mainly comprises investment professionals based in Europe, with the United Kingdom 
being the most common country in which our investment professionals operate.20 The sample also 
includes subjects based in the United States and Canada, thus constituting a geographically diverse 
group of investment professionals (Table 1, Panel B). The most frequent age group is 41-45 (25 
percent), followed by 46-50 (20 percent), then 36-40 (14 percent). We characterize 45 (56 percent) 
investment professionals as ‘accounting experts’ since they either have an accounting degree, or 
state that their occupational responsibilities involve certain aspects of financial reporting. 21 
Occupational details are reported in Table 2. A substantial number of subjects, 44 (54 percent), 
                                                     
18 In an additional analysis, we document that the likelihood that our subjects fail the manipulation checks does not 
depend on the type of treatment they receive. We also conduct sensitivity tests in which we re-run our main analyses 
using a sample containing the 76 observations that receive the final treatment including the 14 subjects that fail the 
manipulation checks. While the results for this sample are statistically weaker for some tests, the tenor of our findings 
remains unchanged. The results of our additional analyses are available in the paper’s GitHub repository. 
19 These results are reported in the paper’s GitHub repository. 
20 The predominance of the United Kingdom reflects both the importance of London as an international financial 
center and the involvement of ICAS in our study. 
21 Although we have no statistics for comparison, it is likely that this proportion is high due to the involvement of a 
professional accounting institute (ICAS) and an accounting regulatory body (EFRAG) in identifying our subjects.  
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consider themselves fund managers, whereas 34 (42 percent) regard themselves as analysts. Of 
these analysts, 22 (27 percent) are on the sell-side. Consequently, the majority of our investment 
professionals (56, or 69 percent) have a buy-side focus (Table 2, Panel A). Most of these focus on 
public equity and have a geographic or industry focus (Table 2, Panel B). 
As shown in Table 2, Panel C, our subjects are highly experienced, with an average of 20 
years of total experience and nine years of experience in their current position. They regularly 
follow an average (median) of 61 (35) firms for their investment decisions. For the subcategory of 
fund managers (Table 2, Panel D), 22  the mean (median) value of funds under individual 
management is around $1.56 billion ($400 million). These subjects hold an average of 82 different 
stocks and their average holding period is approximately 3.5 years. Overall, our main sample 
comprises influential and experienced investment professionals, generally managing sizable 
investment portfolios, for a reasonably long holding period. Based on these demographics, we are 
confident that our subjects are familiar with their assigned objectives and are acquainted with the 
concepts of relevance and representational faithfulness.23 Our interviews with the investment 
professionals provide reassurance that this is the case. For instance, the following quotes illustrate 
subjects’ familiarity with managerial compensation arrangements and with managerial 
performance assessments: 24 
“When I meet with management, especially a company that seems to be getting into trouble - 
financial trouble - I will ask how they are compensated, because it will help me understand what 
they are motivated on.”  
(Fund manager, U.K, Managerial performance evaluation | Accounting-based compensation) 
 
                                                     
22 38 of the 44 fund managers provide this information. In some cases, fund managers were part of a team and were 
unable to state their individual funds under management. 
23 We are confident that the investment professionals are familiar with both for a number of reasons. First, the vast 
majority are able to recall their assigned objective and the corporate governance characteristics of the case firm when 
asked at the end of the interviews. Second, because we conduct face-to-face interviews, the subjects are able to clarify 
any misunderstandings. However, such clarification questions are rare, indicating that the subjects understand what 
they are being asked. Third, we test for significant differences in answering behavior across occupational groups and 
find no qualitative differences. 
24 To enhance readability, quotes are edited to remove stop words (e.g., ‘you know,’ ‘okay,’ and similar). 
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“What I like to do is, you meet the company, you ask them to give you three or four milestones to 
check next year. Like verbal milestones. “I expect to do this …” Or it could be: “I see my margins 
drifting up. I expect these products to become unexpectedly in demand.” … I want [to] come back 
next year, just look at my notes [and say]: “Okay, you said three things. Did these three things 
happen? Why? Or why didn’t they happen?” And if they happened, then I am always going to 
kind of give... okay, management said this... so, I am always going to give them the benefit of the 
doubt.” 
 (Buy-side analyst, U.K., Managerial performance evaluation | Non-accounting-based compensation) 
Descriptive Evidence on the Decision Usefulness of Financial Accounting Information 
Table 3 reports the overall assessments of usefulness of different line items by presenting the 
distributions of scores for relevance (Panel A) and representational faithfulness (Panel B) based 
on the seven-point Likert score and subjects’ verbal responses.25 The first three rows of averages 
(Financial statements (all), Income statement, and Balance sheet) are based on aggregated data 
for each individual line item.26 The verbal responses represent the number of statements explicitly 
relating to relevance and representational faithfulness for the financial statements overall and for 
individual line items. These are coded as negative, neutral, or positive.27  
Panel A shows that investment professionals assess overall financial statement information as 
highly relevant. It also reveals substantial differences between the income statement and balance 
sheet in general, and between different line items in particular. Most line items are assessed as 
highly relevant overall, with income statement components—particularly Revenue and EBITDA—
assessed as most relevant. In contrast, Intangible assets (other than goodwill) and PPE (measured 
at amortized historical cost in the case) are not assessed as highly relevant. Although the former 
                                                     
25 One subject did not assign a score to the representational faithfulness of revenue and pension liabilities. Descriptive 
evidence for the Experimental Sample is available in the paper’s GitHub repository.  
26 We average all responses across balance sheet and income statement line items to form summary measures of 
information usefulness.  
27 To analyze verbal responses, we rely on a coding manual. In the first step, three coders from the research team 
separately analyze 33 (40 percent) randomly selected, anonymized interviews using the manual. A number of topics 
and arguments are identified and classified in this process. The three coders then check each other’s coding for 
consistency across coders. Once a satisfactory level of agreement is reached, the coding manual is finalized. Using 
this manual, two teams (of two coders each) code all interviews. Then, each coder checks all interviews coded by the 
other coder from his/her team. Both coders discuss any areas of disagreement and produce a final list of quotes from 
all 81 interviews. The coding manual and details of the coding process are available in the paper’s GitHub repository. 
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may reflect the nature of the case (manufacturing) firm, this does not explain why PPE receives 
such low relevance assessments. Panel A reveals no consistent view of Goodwill: Likert scores are 
almost uniformly distributed across the relevance scale.  
Overall, the verbal response analysis confirms the Likert scores, indicating that investment 
professionals offer more positive than negative rationales to justify their assessment of relevance. 
Almost 58 percent of responses on relevance (148/256) are coded as positive, with Revenue, 
EBITDA, and Financial instruments receiving particularly positive verbal responses.  
Descriptive statistics for assessments of the representational faithfulness of accounting 
information are presented in Table 3, Panel B. While they assess accounting information to be 
faithfully represented overall, numerical assessments are generally lower than for relevance. 
Moreover, verbal response data present a less positive assessment of representational faithfulness 
than relevance, with only 28 percent of responses coded as positive. Intangible assets (other than 
goodwill), Goodwill, and Net income receive particularly low assessments.  
Despite its status as arguably the most important accounting figure, no positive verbal 
responses are offered for the representational faithfulness of Net income. This is consistent with 
prior literature suggesting that market participants do not rely solely on GAAP earnings (e.g., 
Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Doyle et al. 2003). For instance, Brown et al. (2015) indicate that 
analysts exclude line items such as extraordinary items, discontinued items, restructuring charges, 
and asset impairments, among others, from GAAP earnings.28 
A comparison of both panels of Table 3 strongly indicates that investment professionals 
differentiate between line items according to different measurement bases when assessing the 
                                                     
28 The subtotal nature of Net income and EBITDA could drive the lack of positive verbal responses. These magnitudes 
are not independent of line items such as Revenue. However, our subjects evaluate income statement line items in 
descending sequence, and our findings suggest that they evaluate Net income vis-à-vis EBITDA, effectively focusing 
on the accrual components that distinguish them. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008083
19 
usefulness of accounting information. These results also reveal the value of decomposing the 
overall concept of ‘usefulness’ into relevance and representational faithfulness: experienced 
professional users of financial statements seem quite capable of separating them (cf. Kadous et al. 
2012). For example, while PPE is assessed as more faithfully represented than relevant (t-statistic 
of 5.40), the opposite is true for Financial instruments (t-statistic of 3.76).  
We next turn to the verbal response data to explore some of the rationales that our subjects 
present for their assessments (Table 4). Panel A reports rationales relating to relevance, whereas 
Panel B presents rationales relating to representational faithfulness. Rationales mentioned more 
than ten times are reported separately, with all other rationales aggregated into the Other category. 
The right-most column reports the percentages of positive responses, that is, whether a particular 
line item is assessed as more relevant or faithfully represented given the rationale provided.29 
Overall, the ability of the information to assist users in forecasting is the most commonly cited 
reason for relevance assessments. The following quotes illustrate the (positive and negative) ability 
of certain line items to assist in this context:  
“Because I view EBITDA as one of the key indicators of a business going forward and its ability 
to generate cash....”  
(Fund manager, U.K., Managerial performance evaluation | Non-accounting-based compensation) 
“I’m interested ultimately in understanding the returns that the business is generating from the 
assets that it’s got, so if I can think about the cash returns it’s going to generate, but then the 
plant and equipment, there is this CFROI idea where you ought to inflation-adjust your plant and 
equipment rather than just look at a historical book, so it’s more like a kind of replacement cost 
approach, almost. So that’s one reason why I would maybe assign less weight or I’d want to know 
more information about that plant and equipment, because obviously if it’s a historical book value 
that’s going to inflate the returns from that business, I’d want to know how up to date that plant 
and equipment number was and get it as close to replacement cost as I could.” 
 (Fund manager, U.K., Managerial performance evaluation | Accounting-based compensation) 
 
                                                     
29 To illustrate, for example, ‘Application/Measurement complexity’ is mentioned 19 times in the context of relevance 
(Table 4, Panel A), whereas it is assessed as increasing decision usefulness in only one case (5.3 percent). In all other 
cases (18 out of 19), it is discussed as reducing it.  
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“Goodwill I think is far less important because ... it purely provides historical information. 
Usually, it is very specific acquisitions, which you cannot estimate can be repeated in the future. 
So I would put it [as] not really relevant.” 
(Sell-side analyst, Spain, Managerial performance evaluation | Accounting-based compensation) 
In line with theoretical predictions, Relevance of information to understand managerial 
impact ranks highly in Panel A. The following quotes illustrate this: 
[On the relevance of pension liabilities:] “It has nothing to do with the management ... So it’s a 
seven. Irrelevant. […]  It’s a very important number, but to assess the management performance 
I don’t think it’s relevant. Because, again it could go up ... yields could collapse, yields could 
increase, assumptions of mortality can change ... None of that really has anything to do with ... 
how many widgets these guys make and how much profit they make doing it ... a huge number 
might change and might have nothing to do with management.”  
(Fund manager, U.K., Managerial performance evaluation | Non-accounting-based compensation)  
[On the relevance of net income:] “It is less relevant, because it includes items that are outside 
the control of management… These not within their immediate control would include taxes, 
interest, impairments ....”  
(Sell-side analyst, Canada, Managerial performance evaluation | Accounting-based compensation) 
“Yes, well, I suppose with goodwill it is a historic thing, there is not much the management can 
really do about that; now it has been spent and it has been done.” 
 (Sell-side analyst, U.K., Managerial performance evaluation | Accounting-based compensation) 
Investment professionals do not regard the informational properties of different line items as 
‘fixed’ and often see themselves as able to enhance the relevance of certain line items through their 
own adjustments, as the following quotes indicate:  
“... when we are looking at annual reports we are looking a lot at the off-balance obligations. 
And for instance leases we are looking at. Because what we are working on is to make cases 
comparable. That means that if you had to have two companies who are equal but one of them is 
buying the property and plant and equipment and the other one is leasing it as operating leases, 
then in our world we cannot compare them before we have made some adjustments in relation to 
the P&L and also in relation to the balance sheet. So, we are looking at the off-balance 
obligations as well.”  
(Sell-side analyst, Denmark, Managerial performance evaluation | Accounting-based compensation) 
 
“And I should not feel uncomfortable where I am in a position where I can make the adjustment 
I want to. So, because the reason why the numbers are presented as they are here, that is the 
IFRS, that is the standards. So, as long as the standards allow me and the accounts allow me to 
make the corrections that I want, then, I guess, I should be a happy man.”  
(Sell-side analyst, Denmark, Managerial performance evaluation | Accounting-based compensation) 
Even though our subjects have significant accounting expertise, the complexity involved in 
measurement and in the application of accounting standards is assessed to have a negative 
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influence on relevance under both objectives. As Table 4, Panel B, shows, however, this 
complexity is more influential for assessments of representational faithfulness than relevance. It is 
by far the most commonly cited rationale for the typically low representational faithfulness ratings 
(90 percent of verbal responses are either negative or neutral). Moreover, a further 30 responses 
relate to the complexity inherent in the accounting standards themselves. The following quotes 
exemplify subjects’ views of accounting complexity: 
“Yes, fair value is an art ...”  
(Fund manager, Sweden, Firm valuation | Accounting-based compensation)  
“Accounting for financial instruments is really very complicated; it is hard to see the business 
model of the firm behind financial instruments accounting but it is important.”  
(Buy-side analyst, Switzerland, Firm valuation | Accounting-based compensation) 
“It is again a made-up number, what is goodwill? […] Despite being an accountant, I still do not 
know […] Well, I struggle with the concept of goodwill. And I do not think I am alone in ... I 
appreciate why it’s there, but […] when you look at a balance sheet, you say: ‘What is this?’”  
(Fund manager, U.K., Managerial performance evaluation | Non-accounting-based compensation) 
Given the relatively high level of accounting expertise of our subjects, these views likely 
represent a ‘lower bound’ of concerns over accounting complexity in the investment community.  
The second-most and third-most presented rationales in Panel B (managerial incentives and 
compensation) hint at the concerns that investment professionals have with respect to managerial 
discretion. Numerous quotes indicate an awareness of the potential for earnings management in 
various circumstances not linked to managerial compensation arrangements, though there is also 
a degree of acceptance of such behavior. 
“In some cases it could be that they want to show weak figures if they are undergoing some sort 
of inquiry for competitive practices. In other instances, they could be interested in showing strong 
figures - for instance in a merger process or ... because of the bonuses.”  
(Fund manager, Norway, Managerial performance evaluation | Non-accounting-based compensation) 
“[T]hey’d be fools if they didn’t [manipulate earnings]… and manipulate do I mean they are evil, 
nefarious people trying to do something? Probably not. But are they human beings who will try 
to portray things in the best light? Who will exploit the wiggle room that the standards provide to 
them? Who will exploit the auditors who are happy to look in the other direction with no fault 
being meant to them either? Yes, they will do all of these things. There will be manipulation, 
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perhaps also for good reasons. To avoid stupidities in the standards […] managers could come 
up with a better disclosure than what the standard suggests for this company.”  
(Fund manager, U.S., Firm valuation | Accounting-based compensation) 
Also, our subjects regularly refer to corporate governance aspects of the case firm, including 
auditing and external verification, when assessing whether financial accounting data are faithfully 
represented (recall that the corporate governance system of our case firm is of high quality). The 
vast majority of the verbal responses reflect confidence that governance mechanisms help ensure 
representational faithfulness, as the following quotes illustrate:  
“If they have strong corporate governance, then the risk that someone manipulates earnings is 
very low.” 
 (Sell-side analyst, Denmark, Managerial performance evaluation | Non-accounting-based compensation) 
“That [pension liability] will be a three. And the reason I have a little bit more faith in this is that 
they use... with an independent actuarial advice, so they have some sort of external view of that 
liability.”  
(Fund manager, Denmark, Managerial performance evaluation | Accounting-based compensation) 
Summarizing these findings, there are clear differences in the assessed usefulness across line 
items. Investment professionals find line items to be relevant when they provide information about 
the underlying business model and when they help forecast firm activities or evaluate managerial 
performance. The complexity of measurement and the underlying economics, as well as the 
complexity of the accounting standards per se, are the main reasons why investment professionals 
are skeptical about the representational faithfulness of the information. In addition, managerial 
subjectivity, paired with incentives, is a frequent reason for low assessments. 
How do investment professionals rank financial accounting information relative to alternative 
information sources? We capture this as the relative share that our subjects allocate to financial 
accounting information out of a hypothetical €100,000 budget, compared with their three top other 
non-accounting sources. We ask subjects to specify any three alternative information sources to 
avoid directing them towards certain categories. Table 5 summarizes the responses. It shows that 
investment professionals allocate a comparatively high share (34.8 percent) of their budget to 
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acquiring and analyzing accounting information. Alternative information sources are manifold. 
We summarize them into groups and find that alternative quantitative and qualitative information 
on the business of the firm and competitors captures the largest share. The finding that 
approximately one third of the information environment of investment professionals consists of 
accounting information is in line with prior studies (Brown et al. 2015) and indicates that, its 
weakness notwithstanding, accounting information remains a key input in investment 
professionals’ decision-making. 
Test Results 
We test our hypotheses based on univariate tests. Multivariate findings (unreported) in which we 
also control for subjects’ personal demographics and include interviewer and verbal response 
coder fixed effects confirm our findings.30 We test three different types of dependent variables: (i) 
the line item assessment of relevance (H1) and representational faithfulness (H2), which are 
evaluated using either Likert scores or the share of positive rationales being stated (Table 6); (ii) 
the frequency of rationales that support our predicted mechanisms (Table 7); and (iii) the relative 
share that our subjects allocate to financial accounting information relative to alternative 
information sources (Table 8). Figure 2 offers a visual representation of our predictions and 
empirical findings from the survey experiment. 
Table 6, Panel A, reports the line item-based test results for the effect of the information 
acquisition objective (managerial performance evaluation or firm valuation) on the assessed 
relevance of financial statement line items. As predicted by H1, overall, investment professionals 
assigned a firm valuation objective assess financial statements as significantly more relevant than 
those assigned a managerial performance evaluation objective. This result holds using both Likert 
                                                     
30 These results are available in the paper’s GitHub repository.  
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scores (p-value<0.05) and verbal response data (p-value<0.01). The Likert score data indicate that 
the differences are due to lower relevance for the balance sheet, whereas the verbal response data 
point to the income statement.31 The differences between means for different line items are all 
negative, and statistically significant for Financial instruments and Pension liabilities. While we 
are cautious not to over-interpret the weakly-powered line item-specific findings, these are 
consistent with the theoretical rationale for H1, as these line items are particularly affected by 
factors assumed to be beyond managerial control. The verbal response data produce a statistically 
significant difference only for Net income. 
In contrast to the confirmatory results for H1, our findings in Table 6, Panel B, reveal no 
support for our prediction under H2 that the presence of earnings management incentives (the use 
of accounting data in managerial compensation) reduces investment professionals’ assessments of 
the representational faithfulness of accounting information. None of the differences in Likert 
scores are statistically significant. Even Net income itself (i.e., the variable forming the basis for 
executive compensation in the accounting compensation treatment) has a difference of only 0.372 
of a Likert score point, with an associated p-value of 0.44. In summary, our line item-based test 
results offer support for H1, but not for H2. 
Table 7, Panel A, presents the rationales provided to justify the relevance assessments, 
conditional on the information acquisition objective treatment. It is clear from the frequency table 
that the rationales match our predicted mechanisms. Investment professionals assigned a 
managerial performance evaluation objective are much more likely to discuss whether a certain 
line item is within managerial control, whereas those assigned a firm valuation objective focus 
                                                     
31 The divergent findings for Likert score and verbal response data may be due to the nature of the interviews. As the 
interviews begin with the income statement, most coded verbal responses relate to the income statement. Later, when 
asked to evaluate balance sheet line items, subjects often refer back to arguments related to the income statement. 
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their rationales on whether a certain line item is helpful for forecasting future firm activities or 
understanding the business model of the firm. These differences are statistically significant (p-
value<0.01), supporting the predicted mechanism underlying H1. 
Table 7, Panel B, in turn, provides limited support for H2. It shows that managerial 
compensation issues are more often discussed when subjects receive case materials indicating 
accounting-based compensation arrangements for managers, but this difference is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (p-value=0.12). A similar observation holds for other managerial 
incentives, where the difference is marginally significant (p-value=0.08). Subjects assigned an 
accounting-based compensation treatment talk significantly less about accounting and 
measurement complexity (p-value=0.03). We contend this unexpected finding may be driven by 
these subjects devoting somewhat more time to managerial incentives issues combined. Overall, 
these findings indicate that the subjects treated with accounting-based compensation arrangements 
talk more about managerial incentives, which is consistent with them receiving the treatment, but 
not with this significantly affecting their assessments of representational faithfulness.32 However, 
we acknowledge that a weak treatment effect may be responsible for the failure to reject the null 
under H2. 
Table 8 presents our final set of survey experiment test results by reporting whether our 
experimental treatments affect the relative share that our subjects allocate to financial accounting 
information from a hypothetical €100,000 budget, compared with their chosen three top alternative 
non-accounting sources. Financial reporting information constitutes only a portion of a firm’s 
                                                     
32 We also conduct a supplementary analysis in which we use investment professionals’ assessments of corporate 
governance quality as an independent variable. These assessments are obtained from the responses to the question 
“The firm in the case faces potentially serious corporate governance issues”. The results of this (non-experimental) 
analysis (available in the paper’s GitHub repository) suggest that positive assessments of corporate governance quality 
are associated with positive assessments of representational faithfulness.  
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information environment (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Beyer et al. 2010). One might expect this 
share to be higher under the firm valuation objective, given that investment professionals view 
accounting information as less relevant for the managerial performance evaluation objective. 
However, the budget allocated to a single information source depends not only on its usefulness, 
but also on the usefulness and availability of alternative information sources. While we do not 
assess the usefulness of alternative information sources directly, our subjects are likely to have 
different views about alternative sources depending on their objectives. Assuming that alternative 
information sources are more readily available and are more useful for the firm valuation objective, 
this may cause investment professionals to assign larger weights to financial accounting 
information when assigned a managerial performance evaluation objective, especially given that 
our case firm is privately owned. 
The significantly positive coefficient for the main effect of the managerial performance 
evaluation treatment in Table 8, Panel B, indicates that investment professionals allocate a lower 
weight to financial accounting information when their assigned objective is firm valuation.33 This 
striking finding is consistent with the second expectation outlined above and indicates that, 
although investment professionals generally assess financial accounting information to be less 
suitable for evaluating managerial performance, they still use it more. The relatively low share 
assigned to firm valuation may reflect the wider variety of timelier and/or forward-looking sources 
available for that purpose (Ball and Shivakumar 2008). This hints at a potential competitive 
                                                     
33  These inferences are confirmed by unreported multivariate tests in which we control for subjects’ personal 
demographics and interviewer fixed effects. These results are available in the paper’s GitHub repository. 
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advantage of financial accounting information in managerial performance evaluation settings, even 
though it is not viewed as optimal for this objective.34 
IV. FOLLOW-UP ONLINE EXPERIMENT 
Research Design 
While our survey experiment provides important evidence for our research questions, it has two 
main shortcomings. First, its sample of 81 investment professionals (62 in the experimental design) 
provides limited statistical power. Second, it examines investment professionals’ assessments 
rather than actions. To address these shortcomings, we design a large-scale follow-up online 
experiment that enables us to observe how a larger sample of investment professionals select a set 
of income statement line items to construct an adjusted earnings measure.35 For this task, we give 
investment professionals basic information about a (different) fictional private European firm, 
including Sales and Cost of Sales numbers as the starting point for the task. We then ask subjects 
to construct their adjusted measure of earnings for the assessment of firm performance by selecting 
from a list of seven additional line items: Selling, general and administrative expenses; 
Depreciation and amortization; Fair value gains on marketable securities (mark to market); Fair 
value gains on unlisted equity instruments (mark to model); Gains on investment properties; 
Interest expense; and Taxation expense. 
                                                     
34 As the positive effect of the managerial performance evaluation objective is predominantly driven by subjects who 
receive the case with managerial compensation based on non-accounting information, we also document a negative 
main effect for compensation being linked to financial accounting on the share of accounting information. This is 
consistent with investment professionals using financial accounting less when accounting information is used in 
compensation contracts, particularly when their information acquisition objective is to assess managerial performance. 
While we are cautious about offering a rationale for such an unpredicted effect, it is possible that investment 
professionals rely more on external information when evaluating managerial performance in these circumstances, as 
they prefer to balance the information used in compensation with outside information to assess its robustness. 
35 Further details of our follow-up online experiment, as well as the code and the response data, are available in the 
Online Appendix and in the paper’s GitHub repository.  
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Applying a 2×2 between-subjects design, we manipulate: (i) the corporate governance quality 
of the case firm (designated either as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ relative to industry-peers); and (ii) the 
earnings management incentives (managerial compensation linked either to earnings or internal 
production data). We manipulate corporate governance quality to allay the concern that the null 
result of our survey experiment could be driven by strong corporate governance curtailing 
investment professionals’ concerns over compensation-driven earnings management incentives. 
We deliberately choose line items that encompass varying degrees of managerial discretion. 
Specifically, since our objective is to understand whether subjects include/exclude line items that 
inflate earnings—and gain line items give rise to unambiguous expectations—we effectively 
manipulate the existence of income-increasing earnings management incentives. Our line items 
are also of similar magnitude to enable us to compare their inclusion probabilities in a meaningful 
way. Based on this, our interest lies in differences between: (i) the line items Fair value gains on 
unlisted equity instruments (mark to model) and Gains on investment properties (i.e., higher 
managerial discretion) and (ii) the line item Fair value gains on marketable securities (mark to 
market) (i.e., lower managerial discretion). Our expectation, which is based on H2, is that 
accounting-based managerial compensation makes it relatively less likely that our subjects include 
line items with higher levels of managerial discretion. In addition, we predict the same effect for 
subjects that receive the ‘weak governance’ treatment. Finally, we predict a negative interaction 
effect, meaning that the effect should be even more pronounced when corporate governance is 
weak and managerial compensation is based on accounting data. 
Sample and Descriptive Findings 
To administer the follow-up online experiment, we first obtain the email addresses of all 
individuals designated as ‘Security Analyst,’ ‘Associate Analyst,’ and ‘Portfolio Manager’ in the 
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Eikon database, excluding portfolio managers whose secondary role descriptions indicate a passive 
approach to investing. We obtain 63,905 email addresses via this process. We email a link to the 
web-based task (sent late June and early July 2019). We receive delivery failure notifications from 
7,507 recipients and, of the remaining 56,398, 1,241 responded to the email by accessing the task 
and 948 completed the task. Of these, 833 pass both manipulation checks and are thus included in 
our analysis. The size of our sample allays concerns about lack of power. Our response rate of 
approximately 2 percent is low, but broadly comparable with other large-scale surveys of 
professional investors (e.g., Drake et al. 2019). In our final sample, 596 subjects are characterized 
by Eikon as analysts and 237 as portfolio managers; 262 are based in North America, 377 in 
Europe, and 194 in the rest of the World. 
Table 9, Panel A, reports the large variation in (unconditional) inclusion rates for all line items. 
Whereas virtually all subjects include Other selling, general and administrative expenses, and 
around three quarters include Depreciation and amortization, Interest expense, and Taxation 
expense, less than 14 percent include Fair value gains on marketable securities (mark to market) 
and only half of these (7 percent) include Fair value gains on unlisted equity instruments (mark to 
model). The difference between the gains variable with less managerial discretion (Fair value 
gains on marketable securities (mark to market)) and the other two gain variables is significant at 
conventional levels (Fair value gains on unlisted equity instruments (mark to model): p-
value<0.01; Gains on revaluation of investment property: p-value<0.01). These descriptive 
findings increase our confidence that the assessment-based findings of the first experiment match 
the task-based evidence from the follow-up online experiment. Investment professionals are more 
likely to use income statement line items that are less complex, fit the business model of the 
reporting firm, and are less prone to managerial discretion. 
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Test Results 
To examine the effects of the treatment on the usefulness of accounting information, our main tests 
examine managerial earnings incentives (i.e., linking managerial compensation to earnings), 
variation in corporate governance quality (i.e., weak or strong), and their interaction. To construct 
our dependent variable, we focus on the three line items Fair value gains on marketable securities 
(mark to market), Fair value gains on unlisted equity instruments (mark to model), and Gains on 
revaluation of investment property, because these three line items are similar in nature and 
magnitude. Our treatments are designed to make the subjects focus more on representational 
faithfulness when choosing line items for their adjusted earnings measure. This is intended to make 
them relatively more likely to include Fair value gains on marketable securities (mark to market) 
(low managerial discretion) and relatively less likely to include Fair value gains on unlisted equity 
instruments (mark to model) and Gains on revaluation of investment property (high managerial 
discretion). The results of our analysis assessing this effect are presented in Figures 4 and 5, as 
well as in Table 9, Panel B.  
As Figure 4 illustrates, the effect of the earnings management incentives treatment on the 
likelihood that the gains line items are included is small and inconsistent. However, the pattern for 
the corporate governance treatment is clearly identifiable. Subjects presented with a weak 
corporate governance case are more likely to include Fair value gains on marketable securities 
(mark to market) and less likely to include Fair value gains on unlisted equity instruments (mark 
to model), as well as Gains on revaluation of investment property. Figure 5 contrasts our empirical 
predictions with our findings and presents our dependent variable, Delta Include, which we also 
use in our subject-level analysis, results of which are presented in Table 9, Panel B. Delta Include 
is the percentage point difference between: (i) the average of the inclusion probabilities for the line 
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items Fair value gains on unlisted equity instruments (mark to model) and Gains on revaluation 
of investment property and (ii) the inclusion probability of the line item Fair value gains on 
marketable securities (mark to market). Because our subjects can either include (1) or not (0) a 
line item, Delta Include can vary between -1 and 1 with feasible values being [-1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1]. 
We find a sizeable treatment effect of around four percentage points for the main effect of the 
corporate governance treatment, while we document no significant effect for the earnings 
management incentive treatment and also no identifiable interaction effect.  
Table 9, Panel B, presents the results of our subject-level analysis in which we use Delta 
Include as dependent variable. Without including an interaction effect, we observe the significant 
3.8 percentage point effect of the governance treatment that can also be observed from Figure 5 
and no significant effect for the earnings management incentive treatment. When we include 
interaction effects, we find a marginally significant main effect for corporate governance and a 
positive (albeit insignificant) effect for the interaction, which runs counter to our expectations.  
Again, we find no significant effect for the earnings management incentive treatment.  
We draw three conclusions from our follow-up online experiment. First, our task-based 
evidence is in line with our assessment-based evidence: Investment professionals are more likely 
to use financial accounting information if it fits the underlying business model of the reporting 
firm, is subject to little managerial discretion, and entails a lower degree of complexity. Second, 
high-quality governance makes investment professionals more tolerant of managerial discretion. 
Third, despite the substantially increased statistical power, we find no robust evidence that 
investment professionals consider accounting-based managerial compensation arrangements as 
significantly detrimental to the usefulness of accounting information. Again, however, we caution 
that this latter null result may be due to weakness in our treatment. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
We examine how investment professionals assess the usefulness of financial accounting 
information. We combine empirical evidence from a survey experiment and a large-scale follow-
up online experiment and derive the following conclusions. Investment professionals assess the 
relevance of accounting information to be higher when it fits their information acquisition 
objective. When assigned a firm valuation objective, investment professionals prefer information 
that helps them in forecasting future cash flows and understanding the business. The latter is also 
relevant for investment professionals assigned a managerial performance evaluation objective. In 
addition, investment professionals under this condition use accounting information to disentangle 
managerial performance from factors beyond managerial control. Our experimental evidence 
indicates that investment professionals judge the current financial accounting environment to be 
more relevant for firm valuation than for evaluating managerial performance. This finding is in 
line with central tenets of agency theory (Gjesdal 1981; Paul 1992) and adds to the existing 
empirical evidence (Bushman et al. 2006; Banker et al. 2009; Drake et al. 2019), although it casts 
some doubt on the FASB and IASB concept of general purpose financial statements. 
The assessed representational faithfulness of financial accounting information critically 
hinges on the complexity of the underlying firm fundamentals, as well as the extent of managerial 
judgment involved. Our follow-up online experiment provides no evidence that compensation-
induced earnings management incentives alone trigger investment professionals to be more 
skeptical about line items involving high managerial judgment. At the same time, investment 
professionals are willing to accept a higher level of managerial judgment in accounting line items 
when the reporting firm has a high-quality corporate governance system. Collectively, our findings 
are consistent with investment professionals having a more holistic understanding of managerial 
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incentives (as in Laux and Laux 2009) and with views that are critical of widespread beliefs that 
earnings management is pervasive (e.g., Ball 2013). Although subject to the caveat that our 
treatment may not be strong enough to detect a true underlying effect, this important finding 
contrasts with the long line of research that sees earnings management as a problematic 
consequence of tying compensation to accounting numbers (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; 1986; 
Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995; Goldman and Slezak 2006; Crocker and Slemrod 2007; 
Dichev et al. 2013). 
Regardless of its shortcomings, financial accounting information appears to remain a key input 
to investment professionals’ decision making. The fact that this evaluation is more pronounced 
when investment professionals are assigned a managerial performance evaluation objective 
suggests a competitive advantage of financial accounting information for this objective. We 
believe this result is worthy of further investigation. Future research could also examine how to 
structure financial accounting information to cater to heterogeneous information acquisition 
objectives and whether the usefulness of accounting information varies with information 
acquisition objectives other than valuation or stewardship.  
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Exhibits 1 and 2  
 
EXHIBIT 1: Financial Information 
 
Summary Balance Sheet (€ m) 
    Cash 208 
    Receivables 212 
    Inventory 105 
    Financial investments 634 
    Plant and equipment 416 
    Goodwill 443 
    Other intangible assets 432 
Total assets 2,450 
    Trade payables 216 
    Pension liabilities 435 
    Long term debt 628 
    Equity 1,171 
Total liabilities and equity 2,450 
 
Annual Income Statement (€ m) 
Revenue 2,185 
Cost of sales (1,382) 
Other expenses (416) 
Investment income 148 
EBITDA 535 
Depreciation and amortization (114) 
Goodwill impairment (58) 
EBIT  363 
Interest expenses (80) 
Taxes (123) 
Net income 160 
 
 
Accounting policy information 
 
The financial statements are prepared using IFRS. The firm uses a historical cost basis except that financial instruments 
are measured at fair value and certain other assets and liabilities are included on an alternative basis – most 
significantly, pension liabilities. 
 
Summary of selected accounting policies 
Plant and equipment and other intangible assets are measured at cost. The value of goodwill is tested for impairment 
on an annual basis. Financial investments are measured at fair value, with changes in fair value directly reflected in 
net income. Pension liabilities are the net of the present value of defined benefit plan obligations and external plan 
assets.  
 
Key areas of judgment and estimation uncertainty 
The key areas of estimation uncertainty and of judgment required in applying the firm’s accounting policies are: 
• The firm holds a number of minority investments in firms that are not listed on public equity markets. These 
investments are measured at fair value, requiring the use of managerial estimates.  
• The firm has significant intangible assets. Judgment is required to decide whether intangible assets should be 
recognized and in determining goodwill and intangible asset impairments. 
• The accounting valuation of the pension liability is based on assumptions determined with independent 
actuarial advice and is assessed annually. 
 
EXHIBIT 2: Auditing and corporate governance information 
 
The firm is audited by a leading audit firm. The corporate governance is of a high standard and comfortably passes a 
quality level that would be required from a publicly-listed firm of the same size. In fact, the CGFA Institute, a well-
reputed independent group that evaluates corporate governance and makes this information available to current and 
future investors, has rated the firm as an industry leader in corporate governance quality, assessing the quality of the 
firm corporate governance as seen below.  
 
Independent assessment of the firm’s corporate governance quality 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1=Lowest standard                                                                                                                         10=Highest Standard 
 








This figure presents the design of our survey experiment. We manipulate the information acquisition 
objective and the earnings management incentives, generating four different (2×2) conditions. These 
conditions are administered to our subjects in a between-subject design. Each subject in our survey 
experiment receives only one condition and is not aware that multiple conditions exist. The reported 
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Figure 2: Predictions and Empirical Findings of Survey Experiment 
  
This figure reports the predicted effects of our two manipulations (i.e., information acquisition objective and earnings 
management incentives) on the assessed usefulness of financial accounting information (left column), as well as the univariate 
mean effects for a sample of 62 investment professionals based on Likert score data (middle column) and verbal response 
data (right column). The solid line indicates the valuation treatment conditions and the dashed line indicates the managerial 
performance evaluation conditions. The bars capture the standard errors of the respective treatment condition. 
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Figure 3: Screenshot of Follow-Up Online Experiment 
 
 
This screenshot captures the main experimental screen of our follow-up online experiment. The screenshot 
portrays the actions of a fictional subject who selects the highlighted line items to include in her/his adjusted 
earnings measure. Further details of the follow-up online experiment are presented in the Online Appendix and 
in the paper’s GitHub repository. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008083
 42 
Figure 4: Follow-Up Online Experiment Gain Line Item Findings 
 
This figure reports the effects of our two manipulations (i.e., strength of corporate governance system and earnings management incentives) on the inclusion 
probability of the gain line items. The bars capture the standard errors of the inclusion probability of the given line item for the respective treatment condition.   
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Figure 5: Follow-Up Online Experiment Predictions and Empirical Findings 
 
  
This figure reports the predicted effects of our two manipulations (i.e., strength of corporate governance system and earnings management incentives) on the 
usefulness of financial accounting information (left column), as well as the univariate mean effects for a sample of 833 investment professionals based on the 
differential inclusion probability for gain line items with and without managerial discretion (right column). The solid line indicates the high-quality corporate 
governance treatment conditions and the dashed line indicates the low-quality corporate governance conditions. The bars capture the standard errors of the 
respective treatment condition.  
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Table 1: Sample Composition and Personal Demographics 
 
Panel A: Sample Composition. 
Sample Construction Obs. Interviews Verbal Responses 
Full Sample 81 696 
– Interviews from the experimental pilot phase (5) (61) 
– Interviews with failed manipulation checks (14) (98) 
Experimental Sample 62 537 
 
Panel B: Full Sample Personal Demographics - Country of Work 
Country of Work Obs. % 
Austria 2 2.5 
Belgium 5 6.2 
Canada 4 4.9 
Croatia 2 2.5 
Denmark 7 8.6 
France 3 3.7 
Germany 6 7.4 
Italy 3 3.7 
Norway 2 2.5 
Portugal 1 1.2 
Serbia 1 1.2 
Spain 3 3.7 
Sweden 3 3.7 
Switzerland 6 7.4 
United Kingdom 28 34.6 
United States 5 6.2 
Total 81 100.0 
 
Panel C: Full Sample Personal Demographics - Age Group 
Age Group Obs. % 
20-25 1 1.2 
26-30 5 6.2 
31-35 7 8.6 
36-40 11 13.6 
41-45 20 24.7 
46-50 16 19.8 
51-55 8 9.9 
56-60 8 9.9 
>60 5 6.2 
Total 81 100.0 
Panel A presents the different samples used in our survey experiment. The Full Sample comprises 81 interviews for 
which 696 verbal responses are coded. The Experimental Sample is based on a subsample of interviews from the Full 
Sample for which: (i) interviews from the experimental pilot phase are excluded; and (ii) all subjects pass the 
manipulation checks. Panels B and C report key demographic information about the interviewed investment 
professionals. Descriptive statistics are based on the Full Sample of 81 interviews. 
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Table 2: Full Sample Occupational Demographics 
 
Panel A: Nature of Occupation 
Occupation Obs. % 
Fund Manager 44 54.3 
Analyst (sell-side) 22 27.2 
Analyst (buy-side) 12 14.8 
Other 3 3.7 
Total 81 100.0 
 
Panel B: Investment Characteristics 
Investment Characteristic Obs. % 
By asset class:   
Equity only 69 85.2 
Debt only 9 11.1 
Equity and debt 3 3.7 
By listing type:   
Public firms only 58 71.6 
Public and private firms 17 21.0 
Private firms only 6 7.4 
By industry focus:   
None 36 44.4 
Non-financial 34 42.0 
Financial 11 13.6 
By geographic focus:   
Europe 46 56.8 
World 27 33.3 
North America 6 7.4 
Asia 2 2.5 
Total 81 100.0 
 
Panel C: Investment Experience 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Number of stocks monitored per year 77 61.1 70.0 18.0 35.0 85.0 
Years of experience overall 81 20.1 8.6 15.0 20.0 25.0 
Years of experience in current position 78 8.9 7.6 3.0 7.5 13.0 
 
Panel D: Characteristics of Funds under Management 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Value of funds under management 
(USD Mil.) 38 1,562.4 2,864.6 100.0 436.6 1,700.0 
Number of stocks held 38 82.3 138.4 30.0 50.0 88.0 
Average holding period (Years) 38 3.7 4.7 1.8 3.5 4.0 
This table reports information about the investment background of the interviewed investment professionals. 
Descriptive statistics are based on the Full Sample of 81 investment professionals. Panel A presents the sample 
breakdown by nature of occupation. Panel B presents descriptive information about investment characteristics. Panel 
C presents information on investment experience, and Panel D presents information about the characteristics of the 
funds under management. 
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Table 3: Assessed Usefulness of Financial Accounting Information - Descriptive Evidence 
 
Panel A: Relevance 
 Likert Score Analysis  Verbal Response Analysis 
 Full Sample  (81 Interviews)  
Full Sample 
(81 Interviews | 256 Verbal Responses) 
 Likert Scores (1: Very Low - 7: Very High)  Tone (Negative - Neutral - Positive) 
 Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Obs. Negative Neutral Positive % Positive 
Financial statements (all) 5.097 1.047 33 47 45 84 117 134 188  256 92 16 148 57.8% 
By financial statement component:                
Income statement 5.831 0.879 4 5 9 26 31 59 109  110 29 5 76 69.1% 
Balance sheet 4.657 1.347 29 42 36 58 86 75 79  132 59 8 65 49.2% 
By line item:                
Revenue 6.383 1.168 2 0 0 3 6 17 53  31 2 1 28 90.3% 
EBITDA 5.988 1.309 1 1 3 5 11 22 38  34 7 1 26 76.5% 
Net income 5.123 1.520 1 4 6 18 14 20 18  39 20 2 17 43.6% 
Property, plant and equipment 4.210 1.730 6 7 15 19 15 8 11  23 15 0 8 34.8% 
Financial instruments 5.173 1.679 3 5 5 11 16 20 21  27 7 2 18 66.7% 
Intangible assets (excl. goodwill) 4.395 1.947 8 10 9 9 20 10 15  21 10 2 9 42.9% 
Goodwill 4.222 2.086 11 14 4 10 15 13 14  39 16 2 21 53.8% 
Pension liabilities 5.284 1.502 1 6 3 9 20 24 18  18 7 2 9 50.0% 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008083
 47 
Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Representational Faithfulness 
 Likert Score Analysis  Verbal Response Analysis 
 Full Sample (81 Interviews)  
Full Sample 
(81 interviews | 440 Verbal Responses) 
 Likert Scores (1: Very Low - 7: Very High)  Tone (Negative - Neutral - Positive) 
 Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Obs. Negative Neutral Positive % Positive 
Financial statements (all) 4.689 1.046 9 26 28 39 48 53 40  440 297 20 123 28.0% 
By financial statement component:                
Income statement 5.142 1.137 7 15 23 26 49 69 53  127 97 2 28 22.0% 
Balance sheet 4.418 1.205 7 17 26 32 52 63 46  217 158 11 48 22.1% 
By line item:                
Revenue 5.963 1.096 0 1 2 6 9 34 28  34 15 1 18 52.9% 
EBITDA 5.012 1.624 3 4 9 9 19 22 15  40 33 1 6 15.0% 
Net income 4.407 1.723 4 10 12 11 21 13 10  40 40 0 0 0.0% 
Property, plant and equipment 5.481 1.379 0 3 5 12 12 28 21  19 5 1 13 68.4% 
Financial instruments 4.173 1.766 5 13 11 16 15 12 9  67 59 2 6 9.0% 
Intangible assets (excl. goodwill) 3.864 1.579 4 14 19 13 18 9 4  40 34 3 3 7.5% 
Goodwill 3.765 1.720 12 8 14 16 19 8 4  43 38 2 3 7.0% 
Pension liabilities 4.775 1.583 4 5 6 12 26 17 10  45 19 3 23 51.1% 
This table reports the assessed usefulness (i.e., relevance and representational faithfulness) of financial accounting information for the Full Sample of 81 interviews for which 
696 verbal responses are coded. Panel A (B) reports descriptive information about relevance (representational faithfulness). Reported Likert scores are based on the level of 
agreement with the statement ‘For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial accounting information items to be relevant/faithfully represented.’ The Likert 
scale used ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with higher values indicating higher levels of assessed relevance/representational faithfulness. The verbal 
responses are coded to relate to: (i) a listed line item; (ii) the income statement overall (Income statement); (iii) the balance sheet overall (Balance sheet); or (iv) financial 
statements overall (Financial statements (all)). Financial statements (all), Income statement, and Balance sheet represent summary measures of information usefulness. 
Financial statements (all) is calculated as the average of all responses across balance sheet and income statement line items and the general responses in case of the verbal 
responses. Income statement is calculated as the average of all responses across income statement line items and the general responses in case of the verbal responses. Balance 
sheet is calculated as the average of all responses across balance sheet line items and the general responses in case of the verbal responses. The tone of each coded verbal 
response is classified as negative, neutral, or positive. The percentage of positive verbal responses captures the proportion of positive verbal response over the sum of negative, 
neutral, and positive verbal responses. 
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 Table 4: Rationales Underlying Usefulness Assessments 
 
Panel A: Relevance 
 
Full Sample 




Verbal Responses % Positive Responses 
Relevant for forecasting 83 62.7% 
Relates to managerial impact and/or control 49 46.9% 
Relates to the nature of the business 28 75.0% 
User-side info adjustments 24 58.3% 
Other information 21 81.0% 
Application/measurement complexity 19 5.3% 
Other  32 62.5% 
Total 256 57.8% 
 
 
Panel B: Representational Faithfulness 
 
Full Sample 




Verbal Responses % Positive Responses 
Application/measurement complexity 150 8.7% 
Other managerial incentives 53 1.9% 
Managerial compensation 45 0.0% 
Auditing 44 97.7% 
Accounting standards complexity 30 30.0% 
Notes and mandated disclosures 27 29.6% 
External verification 21 95.2% 
Relates to managerial impact and/or control 14 0.0% 
Other  38 50.0% 
Total 440 28.0% 
This table reports the most frequent rationales raised by investment professionals to justify their assessments of 
relevance (Panel A) or representational faithfulness (Panel B). Every rationale that is mentioned more than 10 times 
in the Full Sample is presented separately. All other rationales are aggregated under Other. 
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Table 5: Alternative Information Sources 
 
 Full Sample 
Financial accounting 34.8% 
Quantitative information on business 13.4% 
Qualitative information on business 13.7% 
Competitors 12.3% 
Governance 3.9% 
Macroeconomic information 2.5% 
Information on management 2.7% 
Product market 8.1% 
Other 8.5% 
Total 100.0% 
This table reports investment professionals’ allocations of a fictitious budget across alternative information sources.  
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Table 6: Treatment Effects by Line Item 
 
Panel A: Relevance 
 Likert Score Analysis  Verbal Response Analysis 
 Experimental Sample  (62 Interviews)  
Experimental Sample 
(62 Interviews | 193 Verbal Responses) 
 Information Acquisition Objective Treatment     
Information Acquisition 























Category Mean Likert Scores     % Positive Verbal Responses   
Financial statements (all) 5.040 5.423 -0.383  0.018  193 47.9% 69.1% -0.212  0.003 
By financial statement component:            
Income statement 5.871 6.000 -0.129  0.528  78 50.0% 84.1% -0.341  0.011 
Balance sheet 4.542 5.077 -0.535  0.011  103 48.2% 55.3% -0.071  0.281 
By line item:             
Revenue 6.484 6.548 -0.065  0.662  22 80.0% 91.7% -0.117  0.736 
EBITDA 5.935 6.129 -0.194  0.623  25 50.0% 88.2% -0.382  0.164 
Net income 5.194 5.323 -0.129  0.782  29 31.3% 69.2% -0.380  0.056 
Property, plant and equipment 4.355 4.484 -0.129  0.688  15 25.0% 36.4% -0.114   
Financial instruments 5.065 5.774 -0.710  0.063  23 61.5% 80.0% -0.185  0.733 
Intangible assets (excl. goodwill) 4.258 4.774 -0.516  0.323  18 50.0% 40.0% 0.100  0.653 
Goodwill 4.097 4.677 -0.581  0.306  28 52.9% 54.5% -0.016  0.950 
Pension liabilities 4.935 5.677 -0.742  0.077  16 41.7% 100.0% -0.583   
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Representational Faithfulness 
 Likert Score Analysis  Verbal Response Analysis 
 Experimental Sample  (62 Interviews)  
Experimental Sample 
(62 interviews | 344 Verbal Responses) 
 Earnings Management Incentive Treatment      
Earnings Management Incentive 



























 Mean Likert Scores     % Positive Verbal Responses   
Financial statements (all) 4.800 4.718 0.082  0.745  344 33.5% 26.1% 0.075  0.410 
By financial statement component:            
Income statement 5.267 5.148 0.119  0.721  99 34.6% 19.1% 0.155  0.153 
Balance sheet 4.520 4.459 0.061  0.880  175 30.1% 19.5% 0.106  0.305 
By line item:             
Revenue 5.886 5.963 -0.077  0.661  31 71.4% 41.2% 0.303  0.160 
EBITDA 5.171 5.111 0.060  0.902  29 29.4% 8.3% 0.211  0.256 
Net income 4.743 4.370 0.372  0.444  27 0.0% 0.0% 0.000   
Property, plant and equipment 5.629 5.333 0.295  0.435  18 90.0% 50.0% 0.400  0.154 
Financial instruments 4.257 4.444 0.187  0.615  48 16.7% 8.3% 0.083  0.485 
Intangible assets (excl. goodwill) 4.000 3.704 0.296  0.548  37 8.7% 7.1% 0.016  0.739 
Goodwill 3.857 3.778 0.079  0.934  32 0.0% 5.0% 0.050   
Pension liabilities 4.857 5.037 0.180  0.642  38 59.1% 50.0% 0.091  0.480 
The analysis presented in this table is based on the Experimental Sample (62 interviews). Panel A (Panel B) presents univariate differences in relevance (representational 
faithfulness) across the alternative information acquisition objectives (i.e., managerial performance evaluation and firm valuation). Reported average Likert scores are based on 
the level of agreement with the statement ‘For my objective in the case, I assess the following financial accounting information items to be relevant/faithfully represented.’ The 
Likert scale used ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with higher values indicating higher levels of assessed relevance/representational faithfulness. The tone 
of each coded verbal response is classified as negative, neutral, or positive. The percentage of positive verbal responses captures the proportion of positive verbal response relative 
to all responses. The verbal responses are coded to relate to: (i) a listed line item; (ii) the income statement overall (Income statement); (iii) the balance sheet overall (Balance 
sheet); or (iv) financial statements overall (Financial statements (all)). Financial statements (all), Income statement, and Balance sheet represent summary measures of information 
usefulness. Financial statements (all) is calculated as the average of all responses across balance sheet and income statement line items and the general responses in case of the 
verbal responses. Income statement is calculated as the average of all responses across income statement line items and the general responses in case of the verbal responses. 
Balance sheet is calculated as the average of all responses across balance sheet line items and the general responses in case of the verbal responses.  The tests for statistical 
significance in the Likert score analysis are based on the relevant main effect of interacted Anova models, whereas the tests for statistical significance in the verbal response 
analysis are based on Wald tests of the relevant main effects in interacted logit models using data at the response level. Missing statistics are due to lack of variation in any of the 
four condition cells. Statistically significant differences below the 10% level (two-tailed) appear in bold print. 
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Table 7: Rationales Underlying Treatment Effects 
Panel A: Relevance 
 
Experimental Sample 
 (193 Verbal Responses) 
 Information Acquisition Objective Treatment 
Rationale: 
Managerial Performance Evaluation  Firm Valuation 
Verbal Responses % Positive Responses  Verbal Responses 
% Positive 
Responses 
Relevant for forecasting*** 14 50.0%  45 64.4% 
Relates to managerial impact and/or control*** 35 45.7%  2 50.0% 
Relates to the nature of the business*** 3 33.3%  15 86.7% 
User-side info adjustments 9 44.4%  9 88.9% 
Other information 7 57.1%  13 92.3% 
Application/measurement complexity 10 10.0%  6 0.0% 
Other  18 72.2%  7 57.1% 
Total 96 47.9%  97 69.1% 
 
Panel B: Representational Faithfulness 
 
Experimental Sample 
(344 Verbal Responses) 
 Earnings Management Incentive Treatment 
Rationale: 
Non-Accounting-Based Compensation  Accounting-Based Compensation 
Verbal Responses % Positive Responses  Verbal Responses % Positive Responses 
Application/measurement complexity** 69 11.6%  55 9.1% 
Other managerial incentives* 14 7.1%  26 0.0% 
Managerial compensation 12 0.0%  22 0.0% 
Auditing 18 100.0%  18 94.4% 
Accounting standards complexity 11 27.3%  16 37.5% 
Notes and mandated disclosures 6 16.7%  5 40.0% 
External verification 7 100.0%  11 100.0% 
Relates to managerial impact and/or control 6 0.0%  2 0.0% 
Other  16 12.5%  15 80.0% 
Total 165 26.1%  179 33.5% 
This table reports the most frequent rationales that are raised by investment professionals to justify their assessments of relevance (Panel A) or representational faithfulness (Panel 
B). Every rationale that is mentioned more than 10 times in the Full Sample is presented separately. All other rationales are aggregated as Other. ***, **, and * denote statistically 
significant differences across treatments (based on χ2 tests) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 8: Treatment Effects for Relative Importance of Alternative Information Sources 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment 
  Experimental Sample 
 Information Acquisition Objective Treatment  
Earnings Management 













Financial accounting 37.3% 29.8%  31.2% 36.7% 
Quantitative information on 
business 
16.2% 13.7%  15.1% 14.7% 
Qualitative information on 
business 
12.0% 14.1%  15.7% 9.6% 
Competitors 11.5% 15.2%  14.3% 12.0% 
Governance 2.8% 5.1%  2.1% 6.4% 
Macroeconomic information 1.5% 2.9%  0.6% 4.3% 
Information on management 4.2% 1.0%  4.4% 0.2% 
Product market 9.0% 8.1%  8.9% 8.1% 
Other 5.6% 10.2%  7.8% 8.0% 
Total 100.00% 100.00%  100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Panel B: Treatment Effects 
 Experimental Sample 
 Dependent variable: % Financial Accounting 
Experimental treatment effects:  
(A) Information acquisition objective: 
Managerial performance evaluation 
0.141** 
(0.023) 




(A) × (B) -0.089 (0.364) 
p-value of test for main effect (A) 0.032 
p-value of test for main effect (B) 0.009 
Obs. (interviews) 62 
R2 0.095 
This table reports the treatment effects for the additional information sources provided by investment professionals. 
Tests are conducted on the Experimental Sample (62 observations) using OLS estimation and bootstrapped standard 
errors (1,000 iterations) clustered by interviewer. The presented p-values for the experimental main effects are two-
tailed and based on Wald tests of the joint significance of the coefficients of the main effect of the regression above 
plus 0.5 times the interaction effect. Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 9: Follow-Up Online Experiment 
 
Panel A: Unconditional Inclusion Probabilities by Line Item 
Line Item Inclusion Probability 
Other selling, general, and administrative expenses 95.0% 
Depreciation and amortization 76.1% 
Fair value gains on marketable securities (mark to market) 13.6% 
Fair value gains on unlisted equity instruments (mark to model) 7.3% 
Gains on revaluation of investment property 9.1% 
Interest expense 76.8% 
Taxation expense 76.0% 
 
Panel B: Experimental Findings 
 Follow-Up Online Experiment Sample 
 Dependent variable:  
Delta Include 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.032* -0.028 
 (0.054) (0.152) 
Experimental treatment effects:   
(A) Corporate governance Treatment: 
Weak Governance Regime 
-0.038** -0.046* 
(0.047) (0.089) 




(A) × (B)  0.017 
 (0.662) 
p-value of test for main effect (A)  0.046 
p-value of test for main effect (B)  0.838 
Obs. 833 833 
R2 0.005 0.005 
This table reports the findings of our follow-up online experiment using the Follow-Up Online Experimental Sample 
(833 observations). Panel A reports the unconditional inclusion probabilities for the line items included in the 
experiment. Panel B reports the treatment effects. The dependent variable Delta Include is the percentage point 
difference between: (i) the average of the inclusion probabilities for the line items Fair value gains on unlisted equity 
instruments (mark to model) and Gains on revaluation of investment property and (ii) the inclusion probability of the 
line item Fair value gains on marketable securities (mark to market). Because our subjects can either include (1) or 
not (0) a line item, Delta Include can vary between -1 and 1 with feasible values being [-1, -0.5, 0, 0.5, 1]. Tests are 
conducted using OLS estimation. The presented p-values for the experimental main effects are two-tailed and based 
on Wald tests of the joint significance of the coefficients of the main effect of the regression above plus 0.5 times the 
interaction effect. Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
The Usefulness of Financial Accounting Information:  
Evidence from the Field 
 
Details of the Survey Experiment  
The design of our survey experiment requires the construction of the case and the survey materials, 
including the experimental conditions used to treat our subjects. All e-mail templates used in 
correspondence, the ethical consent form, survey guidelines for the interviewers, case materials, 
and coding manual can be found in the paper’s GitHub repository: https://github.com/joachim-
gassen/use_fai.  
Development of Survey Experiment Materials 
The case materials are designed to balance the following objectives: 
1. Generalizability: We select a manufacturing firm as representative of the most common 
types of firms in developed economies and one that we expect investment professionals to 
be familiar with. Moreover, the business model of a manufacturing firm is reasonably well 
reflected by financial accounting. To balance this industry choice, which might bias our 
findings towards higher overall usefulness of financial accounting information, we also 
include a portfolio of financial investments and a sizable level of intangible assets into the 
asset structure of our case firm. These line items are typically more relevant in other 
industries, like financial services, pharmaceuticals, or telecommunications. 
2. Focus on core financial accounting information: Our research question assesses the 
usefulness of financial accounting information. Our case firm is private, which avoids the 
subjects referring to stock market information when assessing information usefulness. 
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Furthermore, we exclude cash flow information from our case materials to avoid distracting 
the subjects from the balance sheet and income statement line items. 
3. Variation in properties affecting assessments of relevance and representational faithfulness: 
We select line items with varying degrees of managerial discretion, informativeness about 
managerial activities, informativeness about firm value and financial accounting complexity 
because we expect these factors to affect the usefulness of financial accounting information. 
4. Accessibility: Given the time constraints of our subjects, we design our survey experiment 
to be completed in around 45 minutes and mention this in our contact email. This includes 
the time that we expect our subjects to spend with the case materials. We therefore design 
the case materials with the expectation that it would take less than 5 minutes to process. The 
mean (median) processing time of the case material is 3 minutes and 12 seconds (2 minutes 
and 55 seconds). After the subject has read the case, the interviewer presents a summary of 
each paragraph of the case materials to the subject to make sure that s/he understands the 
case materials. We encourage subjects to ask clarifying questions about the case materials 
(the occasional questions we receive show no systematic pattern). 
The survey experiment design requires careful consideration of the likelihood that the subjects are 
treated, the structure of the case, and the characteristics of the subjects. To refine both the 
characteristics of the case materials and the features of the survey experiment conditions, we 
conduct two pre-tests involving graduate students and investment professionals.  
Pre-Test Phase with Standard Subjects: Graduate Students 
We pre-test our research design by conducting two paper-based and one online survey experiment 
involving 118 graduate students (Master’s in Accounting and Finance students and MBA students 
from two UK universities, and MBA students from a German university). The results of these pre-
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tests are useful to understand whether the case materials are appropriate for standard subjects and 
whether the treatment is received by the subjects. We make marginal changes to the case and adjust 
the survey experiment design after the first pre-test phase. 
Pre-Test Phase with Non-standard Subjects: Investment Professionals 
After the first pre-test phase, we conduct two additional pre-test rounds with investment 
professionals. The first round involves six investment professionals and is used to finalize the case 
materials to ensure that these are appropriate for investment professionals. The second round, based 
on the final case, is used to finalize the experimental treatment. We pre-test our survey experiment 
design on five additional subjects. These subjects are included in our Full Sample of investment 
professionals, but excluded from the Experimental Sample. Following these five interviews, we 
increase the number of experimental conditions from two to four after recognizing that our initial 
instrument has not fully captured different dimensions of the uses of financial accounting 
information (our initial treatments were ‘contracting’ and ‘valuation’; these combined components 
from both treatment arms were then decomposed to allow for a more detailed analysis of how 
investment professionals assess the relevance and representational faithfulness of accounting 
information under different conditions). We run descriptive statistics for the Experimental Sample. 
Univariate analyses based on the two samples available in the paper’s GitHub repository reveal no 
qualitative differences between these groups. 
Identification of Investment Professionals 
We identify our subjects with the assistance of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
(ICAS) and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG). This leads to an initial 
sample of 101 investment professionals. We approach our subjects via email. We mention only 
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that our project involves an ‘interview’ for the purpose of collecting experienced investment 
professionals’ views on the usefulness of financial accounting information. We generally obtain a 
positive response rate, with 88 of the approached investment professionals agreeing to schedule an 
interview, six of whom we use for the first pre-test round. Each investment professional then 
receives more detailed information regarding the research project and the members of the research 
team, but at no point are they informed of the specifics of the method used, or that they would be 
involved in a randomized survey experiment.  
Before the start of each interview and after the interview ends, each investment professional 
is asked to read and, if agreeable, sign an ethical consent form. Only one subject does not agree to 
sign the consent form at the end of the interview and is therefore removed from the sample. 
Investment professionals are asked for permission to record their interviews to enable further 
analysis of their interview materials. Also, they are informed that any sensitive materials covered 
in the interviews and the response data would remain strictly confidential and that any results 
reported would not contain identifying information. Each interviewer uses an interview guideline 
to standardize data collection and minimize interviewer bias. Investment professionals only saw 
the text corresponding to their assigned condition, and no indication of treatment. 
Details of the Follow-Up Online Experiment1,2  
The investment professionals included in our follow-up online experiment are selected from the 
Eikon database. We retrieve the names, gender, email addresses, and contact-address country for 
all investment professionals in the database with the primary function ‘Security Analyst,’ 
                                                            
1 The e-mail templates, online experiment (code and instrument), and illustrative examples of screenshots can be found 
in the paper’s GitHub repository.  
2 Full results from the online experiment which allow the reader to download the data, and/or change the sample under 
analysis, can be accessed online in the paper’s GitHub repository. 
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‘Associate Analyst,’ or ‘Portfolio Manager.’3 This process yields a total of 63,976 individual email 
addresses together with names and gender, after excluding 15 individuals who are included in the 
first experiment. To deliver the email, we partition our sample by two dimensions: 1) the 
geographic region where the investment professional is based (i.e., Europe, North America, and 
rest of the world), and 2) whether Eikon classifies the respective investment professional as a 
portfolio manager or a security analyst. When randomizing the sending order across the resulting 
6 groups, we uniformly distribute all email domains with more than 100 recipients and all countries 
with more than 1,000 recipients to limit the load on individual domains and to ensure balanced 
email administration across time for observable covariates.  
Leaving out the weekend of July 4th, 2019, we send emails over the period June 26th, 2019 to 
July 9th, 2019. We send an email every four seconds from 9:00AM to 7:00PM CEST every day, 
yielding 9,000 emails a day. Invalid email addresses and one domain asking to be excluded from 
receiving emails reduce the number of administered emails to 63,905. We receive delivery failure 
notifications from 7,507 recipients, further reducing the number of successfully administered 
emails to 56,398. Based on the flow of responses, we stop collecting responses exactly one week 
after sending out the last email on July 16th, 2019. 
We obtain 1,241 responses, a bounce-adjusted response rate of 2.2 % (unadjusted response 
rate is 1.9 %). 1,115 do and 922 pass the manipulation checks. 1,105 start and 948 complete the 
assignment. 833 pass both manipulation checks and complete the assignment. While this is a low 
overall response rate, it is in line with prior studies that use comparable online instruments. 
The administered email communicates the general purpose of the study, explains that the data 
would be treated anonymously (to encourage participation), and contains a link to the online 
                                                            
3 When obtaining the data from Eikon, we discard names or email addresses of all portfolio managers whose secondary 
function indicates a passive investment approach. 
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experiment. After clicking on the link, investment professionals are taken to the online experiment, 
which explains that their task is “to calculate adjusted earnings to assess firm performance” for a 
privately-held European firm operating in the manufacturing industry.  
The data are collected in a server-side database together with timestamps. Cookies ensure that 
users are unable to complete the experiment more than once. As subjects are assured anonymity, 
we do not collect any data other than geographic region (North America, Europe, Rest of World) 
and type of occupation (Analyst or Portfolio Manager), which we gather from the stratification of 
the sample. 
We use a 2×2 between subject design, where we manipulate, first, the corporate governance 
quality of the case firm, where investment professionals are informed either that the “corporate 
governance is assessed by external advisors to be strong compared to industry peers” or that 
“corporate governance is assessed by external advisors to be weak compared to industry peers.” 
Second, we manipulate the earnings management incentives in the case firm, where investment 
professionals are informed that the firm bases managerial compensation either “on internal 
production targets” or “on net income.”  
Once investment professionals have reviewed this information, they proceed to our 
manipulation check, and then, to the task itself. This final screen allows investment professionals 
to select and de-select from a list of seven items that can be added to their adjusted earnings 
calculation, which for all cases, already includes Revenue and Cost of Goods Sold. At least one 
item has to be selected before the completed task can be submitted. 
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